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ABSTRACT
Drawing on Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of aesthetic judgment, this text offers an inductive account of 
ﬁnancial reasoning inside a trading room. Driven to maximise bank proﬁts, trading room operators do not 
ﬁnd ‘one best way’. Rather they choose among several possible winning strategies: mathematical 
arbitrage, economic analysis, chartist analysis. These strategies differ sharply from one another in their 
conception of the market, method, proximity to scholarly knowledge, and legitimacy. We show that the 
choice of one method depends on a system of tastes and distastes that are both historical – depending 
on individuals’ social and educational background – and relational – depending on the individual’s 
relative position within the trading room viewed as a ﬁeld.
 Mrch 2016
In the late 1990s, Olivier Godechot set to work at the trading desk of a ﬁnancial brokerage ﬁrm in
Paris, beginning a period of ﬁeldwork that would result in an early contribution to the then-inchoate
social studies of ﬁnance. The editors of the Journal of Cultural Economy are pleased to publish in
translation one piece of that research. Originally published in 2000 as “Le Bazar de la Rationalité”
in Politix (13:52, 17–57), Godechot’s article represents one of the ﬁrst efforts to think through the
rationalities of ﬁnance using the sociological lessons of Bourdieu. Godechot’s Forward – composed
speciﬁcally for this translation – lays out the implications of this work for a contemporary social
studies of ﬁnance oriented to the sociotechnical systems and performative repertoires through
and with which human beings-as-market actors reason. Godechot’s piece underlines the continued
importance of understanding intersecting lines of difference and inequality – of class and rank, race
and status, gender and sexuality, education and family background – that unite and divide the per-
sons who populate ﬁnancial markets. While refusing to “re-embed” ﬁnance in some overarching
social domain, Godechot’s work nonetheless reminds us of the interrelational dispositions and sub-
ject positions of the actors who – alongside and interwoven with technological prostheses, systems
for accounting and payment, legal and institutional architectures –make the markets. For a ﬁeld that
still, at times, takes ﬁnancial calculation for granted, it remains important to remember that the
seeming neutrality of the particular knowledges that ground such calculation is itself a product of
patterned relations of power and privilege. Indeed, much of what Godechot describes is about a
struggle not only to ﬁnd a way to turn a proﬁt – the pragmatic experimentation with “winning strat-
egies” – but also to validate one’s chosen method in the eyes of others. This is a classic – dare I say it?
– social problem, one that has occupied anthropologists since Malinowski’s observations of the role
of prestige in Trobriand Islanders’ battles over kula valuables and political economists since Adam
Smith wrung the discipline’s ﬁrst questions out of a moral philosophy concerned with how others
judged – valued and evaluated – one’s actions. Such contests are sites of political struggle between
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persons who are formed and informed by the histories Godechot is at pains to account for. Perhaps 
it is time that we return to these foundational questions, now fortiﬁed with the lessons of the socio-
technical and the performative.
–Taylor C. Nelms
1. Foreword
‘The Bazaar of Rationality’ (Godechot 2000)1 was ﬁrst discussed during early meetings of the French 
social studies of ﬁnance research group.2 In sharp contrast with the rest of the group, which was 
mainly inspired by Science and Technology Studies (STS), this paper offered a bourdieusian view of 
ﬁnancial activities. It emphasised the continuing importance of classical arguments about social 
determinisms – due to social and educational background (i.e. habitus) and ﬁeld position – to under-
standing ordinary ﬁnancial reasoning.
Like many papers inspired by Pierre Bourdieu, it tried to make a theoretical contribution through 
a case study, to offer food for thought rather than an extensive discussion of the literature (Bourdieu 
& Wacquant 1992). Moreover, the literature on this topic was at the time very scarce. Fourteen years 
later, a substantial amount of sociological literature now addresses the way people think and behave 
in ﬁnancial markets. Nonetheless, I would like to offer here an explanation for why my paper con-
tinues to make an important contribution to the literature until today.
How should we understand ﬁnancial rationality? Contrary to economists who consider ﬁnancial 
rationality a given from which they model ﬁnancial consequences, sociologists are more interested in 
explaining inductively the various forms of rationality, especially through the in situ analysis of 
ordinary work. Research in this area has some cumulative conclusions, and most work will recognise 
ﬁnancial rationality as a combination of technology and people (MacKenzie & Millo 2003; Beunza & 
Stark 2004), ﬁnancial incentives and social norms (Abolaﬁa 1996; Hassoun 2000), cold calculation 
and high-tempered emotions (Beunza & Stark 2004; Hassoun 2005), or culture and division of 
labour (Hertz 1998; MacKenzie 2011). But beyond this broad agreement, approaches remain 
opposed in terms of the emphasis they put on answers to the three following alternatives.
First alternative: Is ﬁnancial rationality a matter of technology or of people? Inspired by STS, an 
important strand of sociological literature highlights the ﬁrst option. Financial actors are embedded 
in a technological environment of market devices that perform economic theory (Callon 1998; 
Callon Millo, & Muniesa 2007). These market devices can be as rudimentary as a ticker (Preda 2006) 
or a printed listing of prices (MacKenzie & Millo 2003) or as complex as a market algorithm 
(Muniesa 2000), mathematical formula, or software programme (MacKenzie & Millo 2003). 
Moreover, new technological means are a way of achieving day-to-day distributed cog-nition 
(Beunza & Stark 2004). Nevertheless, insistence on market devices might lead one to think that 
ﬁnancial rationality only depends on the latter and that people hardly intervene. Most studies of 
concrete ﬁnancial decisions (MacKenzie 2003) show that these are not automatic and that they do 
not derive solely from technological devices. There are interactions, discussion, debates, speculations 
of people who collectively weigh the relevance of arbitrage or prediction (Beunza & Stark 2004; 
Simon et al. 2012). In the end, technology does not replace people.
Second alternative: As people do not just mechanically follow market devices, we might ask, how 
do they act, with their minds or with their bodies? Listening to people explain with great detail their 
vision of the market shows that they clearly use their mind (Schwager 1989; Smith 1999) and some-
times engage in some form of reﬂexivity when they start thinking about the way they and others 
think about the market (Rose 1966; Beunza & Stark 2004; Godechot 2008). However, minds are not 
just cold calculators. They are embedded in ﬂesh. Traders are subject to emotions that they both 
value and fear (Hassoun 2005; Zaloom 2006). A ‘super-trader’ (Widick 2003) is capable of managing 
strong emotions and trading with a lack of concern for both proﬁts and losses. Although the body is 
a threat when it becomes emotional, it also constitutes an important asset when it becomes intuitive. 
Traders describe the sacred moment when they ‘enter the zone’ (Zaloom 2006,
p. 135), when they can trade totally intuitively ‘beneath the level of reﬂexive application of the rules
of the game’ (Widick 2003, p. 679). Although it would be misleading to overemphasise the corpore-
ality of the ﬁnancier, a sound sociological approach to ﬁnancial markets should consider an enlarged
rationality, in which calculation mixes logic, emotions, and intuitions with moral, social, and norma-
tive evaluations.
Third alternative: Is ﬁnancial rationality unique or plural? Studies on the performativity of ﬁnan-
cial theories show a trend towards the uniﬁcation of ﬁnancial rationality, such as the general use of
the same pricing formulae (MacKenzie & Millo 2003) or the adoption of the moral and political
ideology of the efﬁcient market hypothesis (Ortiz 2014). High powered incentives, through sky-
high year-end bonuses, contribute to transform actors into homo economicus (Abolaﬁa 1996;
Godechot 2001; Zaloom 2006). Moreover, within the same trading room, day traders who trade syn-
chronously achieve higher returns (Saavedra, Hagerty, & Uzzi 2011). Does this mean that all ﬁnan-
ciers act the same? Fieldwork shows a great diversity in market behaviour (Aaron, Galanti, &
Tadjeddine 2004). Smith (1999) paints the portrait of six ideal-typical brokers who differ dramati-
cally in terms of their approach to ﬁnancial markets: a fundamentalist using ‘fundamental’ economic
ﬁgures, an insider trying to discover insider knowledge, a cyclist-chartist looking for patterns in past
prices, a trader using his intuition, an efﬁcient market believer who replicates indexes, and a trans-
formationalist focused on the new growth sectors that will revolutionise the economy. Those differ-
ent and sometimes antagonistic approaches often cohabitate within the same trading space.
According to Beunza and Stark, the trading room itself institutes a technological and cognitive
division of labour, which results in a heterarchy (Beunza & Stark 2004; Stark 2009). Zaloom adds
the social dimension, showing how the head of the traders in one trading room wanted to have a cer-
tain amount of social, ethnic, national, gender, and educational diversity in order to produce a diver-
sity of approaches to the market that could nourish one another and help to proﬁt from a variety of
market structures (Zaloom 2006). Hence, the various market approaches do not constitute separate
and independent cultures, as Smith tends to present them (Smith 1999), but they are linked to one
another by relations of hybridisation and sometimes confrontation (Beunza & Garud 2007).
‘The Bazaar of Rationality’ proposes an original way of addressing these alternatives by using a
theoretical apparatus derived from Pierre Bourdieu’s theory of cultural distinction (Bourdieu
1984). Aesthetic judgement is seen as a good guide for modelling concrete ﬁnancial rationality.
First, aesthetic judgement offers a combination of reﬂexive thinking and pre-reﬂexive practical
sense. Trading strategies combine intense calculation with intuitions, tastes, and distastes. Second,
aesthetic judgment as a market approach is very diverse. In ‘The Bazaar’, I study three approaches
traditionally opposed to one another: mathematical arbitrage, economic fundamentalism, and chart-
ism. Third, aesthetic judgement has social origins. It is the result of long-term class socialisation
(encompassed by the concept of habitus): upper classes have a formalistic aesthetic valuing the oppo-
sition of art and life while lower classes are characterised by their ‘taste of necessity’, valuing useful
and pleasant art in the continuity of ordinary life. In ‘The Bazaar’, the more highly educated fans of
mathematical arbitrage clearly value Black and Scholes formulas and the efﬁcient market hypothesis
for their formal properties: purity, generality, transposability, counter-intuitiveness; ﬁnanciers com-
ing from lower classes are fans of chartism, ﬁnding in those methods some continuity with life, an
unsystematic collection of ﬂexible hints learned on the job through a mentor–mentee relationship,
similar to the kind of hints used by anglers or farmers. Fourth, aesthetic judgement is not just a mat-
ter of separate cultures and education but is genuinely relational. The relation of distinction is both a
relation of imitation – we value the things (or the people) that value the people (or the things) we
value – and a relation of demarcation – we disvalue the things (or the people) that value the people
(or the things) we disvalue. Hence, in ‘The Bazaar’, I show how deep controversies among propo-
nents of various approaches follow the logic of aesthetic controversies. For advocates of mathemat-
ical arbitrage, chartism is an intellectual scandal that needs to be both explained and delegitimised. In
contrast, advocates of chartism hesitate between proudly erecting the counter-cultural value of their
method and imitating mathematical arbitrage in order to obtain social recognition.
In the end, the trading room can be viewed as a ﬁeld, whose functioning relates to cultural, scien-
tiﬁc, or economic ﬁelds (Bourdieu 2005; Bourdieu 1996; Bourdieu 1999). Systems of oppositions
within the ﬁeld are not only knee-jerk reactions to distastes, but also ways of reconsidering the
value of the various capitals within the ﬁeld and hence the proﬁts of its various actors. Within the
trading room, valuing and supporting one method over another also inﬂuences the managers of
the trading room, who distribute bonuses and promote people accordingly, based on their appreci-
ation of the causal link between proﬁts, trading methods, and their users. Hence, convincing others
that your trading method is powerful improves your position in the distribution of bonuses and
opens a way toward a dominant position within the trading room.
These results rest decisively on the mixed-methods empirical strategy used during my original
research. I did a four-month ﬁeldwork stint in 1998 in a major equity derivative trading room in
Paris, as a trainee at the equity lending and borrowing desk. This activity, which was necessary to
all other desks (when they needed to short the market), provided a good observatory of the trading
room’s diversity. Combining daily observations, informal discussions, and formal interviews, I could
size up ﬁnanciers’ emotional engagement in different trading strategies and learn about the harsh
debates in which they were involved. A questionnaire, to which half of the trading room responded
(94 total responses), added a crucial objectiﬁcation of the relational system at the root of that ﬁnan-
cial diversity.
One might wonder how much ‘The Baazar’s’ speciﬁc ﬁndings still hold true. Although answering
this question would require new in-depth research, the general principles of oppositions uncovered
in the paper still structure the ﬁnancial ﬁeld today. Oppositions between chartism, fundamental
economic analysis, and mathematical arbitrage have manifested themselves in the long run, fuelling
ﬁnancial discussions for more than a century (Bernstein 1993; Smith 1999; Preda 2006). Moreover, a
small update of my research in 2007 led to similar results (Godechot 2008). Nevertheless, we should
stress two factors of inﬂexion: the arrival of new products and strategies like statistical arbitrage and
high-frequency trading, which ﬁll the paradigmatic gap between chartism and mathematical arbit-
rage; and the growing concentration of top engineering school graduates in derivative trading rooms
in France. While this has led to a decline of chartism, this strategy remains popular in the more het-
erogeneous trading rooms of the UK and the USA, as well as among small online traders.
In sum, ‘The Baazar’ offers an image of ﬁnancial rationality that differs from the one developed by
the performativity approach, which often tends to depict ﬁnancial rationality as technological, con-
sciously calculative, and unique. On the contrary, my paper reintroduces the people, a thinking
people indeed, but a people whose thoughts are also governed by non-reﬂexive social dispositions,
a people structured by a system of relations between its members, from which emerges a diversity – a
true bazaar – of ﬁnancial strategies.
2. The bazaar of rationality: towards a sociology of concrete forms of reasoning
Rationality is a concept debated in many academic disciplines, from philosophy to sociology to econ-
omics, giving rise to many deﬁnitions. A common feature of its various uses in economics is that
rationality – whether parametric or strategic, perfect or limited – is a behaviour attributed a priori
to human beings. Rationality is therefore treated as a causal category (since it enables economic
models, especially those with ‘micro-economic’ foundations, to be established), but rationality is
itself without causes. This unilateral attribution of a uniform rationality to actors is justiﬁed by an
instrumentalist ‘as if’, which generally does not measure the difference with the concrete behaviours
of actors it introduces. Studying rationality from a sociological point of view involves, on the con-
trary, not afﬁrming dogmatically that ‘all is calculation’ or ‘nothing is calculation’, but trying, induc-
tively, to give an account of the ordinary reasoning of ordinary people. For such a programme, it is
necessary to endeavour, insofar as it is possible, to describe the diversity of forms of reasoning and
seek to identify their possible social determination.3
Very few working environments use calculation to the extent that trading rooms do: calculation of
equivalencies, arbitrage, exchange rates, instant proﬁts, but also of efforts, investments, hits, and
career opportunities. Trading rooms are thus a privileged place in which to study sociologically
(rather than logically) rationality, or more speciﬁcally – since the term ‘rationality’, an essential attri-
bute given to man in many disciplines, implies its own perfection – reasoning, with its lucky ﬁnds,
imperfections, short cuts, associations, and computations. Moreover, ﬁnancial markets are charac-
terised not only by their high level of economic and mathematical calculation, but also by their plur-
ality of winning strategies. Incited to maximise the bank’s proﬁts, ﬁnancial operators (traders and
sales people) do not have ‘one best way’ but must instead choose one among several winning strat-
egies (or use them concurrently, which is a form of choice). This choice is partly imposed by the
trading room, its history and function, the economic situation, or the product. However, as these
people are relatively autonomous at work, they can partly avoid those constraints or seek to occupy
positions in which they will be able to use the strategy of their choice. One can thus regard the com-
plete set of winning strategies in the trading room as a true bazaar of rationality, within which people
ﬁnd their way not only according to their position and associated constraints, but also according to
dispositions acquired during primary socialisation in the family or secondary socialisation at univer-
sity or at work. The valorisation of their winning strategy consists not only in turning ﬁnancial prof-
its, but also in fashioning that strategy’s symbolic value, for themselves, their peers, and those in
charge of the bank, which means gambling not only its power and share of redistributed proﬁt,
but also the construction and conﬁrmation of a professional and social identity – in short, the inven-
tion of a position, which remains precarious and contestable.
Within the trading room of a large bank devoted to the arbitrage of equity derivatives,4 three
stabilised forms of reasoning, relatively institutionalised, with their own histories and traditions of
teaching, are available to the actors: a method for arbitrage and brokering, the mathematical arbit-
rage of options, and two methods for speculation, economic analysis and chartist analysis. On the
basis of these three forms, ﬁnancial operators develop their own form of reasoning, more or less
reﬂexive and intuitive, which results in a ﬁnancial transaction.
3. Discovering equivalencies: mathematical ‘arbitrage’ and volatility management
3.1. The outlet for scholastic dispositions
There are all kinds of arbitrage. Some are mathematically quite simple (like spatial arbitrage or cur-
rency arbitrage). However, the most proﬁtable arbitrage in recent years has been the arbitrage of
derivatives (options, exotic options) according to underlying securities (equities, ﬁxed-income secu-
rities), a technique that is based on complex mathematical knowledge.
This form of arbitrage was made possible by the discoveries of Black and Scholes. In 1973, they
uncovered a general formula for the pricing of options. Because the solution was imperfect – due to
the reductive nature of the adopted assumptions – this scientiﬁc discovery triggered, even within
banks themselves, a dynamic of research that sought to improve the formulas and extend this
type of solution to other products. Therefore, when the head of the trading room decided to follow
a policy of arbitrage for a given product, the activity was implemented in the following stages: impor-
tation and improvement of a pricing formula; adaptation of the formula to the design and legal fea-
tures of the product; computerisation of the formula; research of the ﬁrst customers; initiation of the
ﬁrst transactions; routinisation of transactions through the daily reading of parameters permanently
displayed on-screen. These various stages in the activity of arbitrage correspond increasingly to the
division of labour within the trading room: the importation, improvement, and adaptation of the
formulas, as well as their computerisation, is increasingly the domain of engineers, while the market-
ing of the products is the responsibility of salespeople. The traders only manage the securities port-
folio. However, even at the time of my investigation, there were still cases where new activities were
being developed and the entire chain was entrusted to the traders.
This method of organising the activity shows several possible uses of mathematics, associated with
several forms of excellence in the markets. The importation, improvement, and adaptation of for-
mulas are closer to academic mathematical research and require considerable, well-maintained scho-
lastic capital. On the other hand, carrying out daily transactions (and, a fortiori, canvassing
customers) requires a more basic understanding of pricing formulas. This knowledge can decrease
once these other supporting elements are established, particularly the practical routine of handling
the pricing indications shown on the screen. Thus for the ﬁrst population, the improvement of the
arbitrage formula and its replacement by a more powerful one is a regular concern. The others,
meanwhile, must know, at most, what type of errors the formula entails; they might even treat pri-
cing indicators on the screen as indicators like any other, some of which they would follow strictly
and others less.
Therefore, complex mathematics played a historical role and founded the legitimacy of trading
positions in the trading room at Universal Company (UC). However, as increasing computerisation
deprives traders of their control over arbitrage formulas, and with greater importance given in the
room to the commercialisation of derivatives and to speculation rather than arbitrage, complex
mathematics has become more of a moral guarantee than a skill used on a daily basis.
Thus, only 50% of the members of the room answered that they use mathematical relations based
on stochastic mathematics. For the majority of them, the use of Black–Scholes is somewhat instru-
mental, since 13% of the room’s members state that it is a ‘push-button’ relation and 26% say that it
is a relation whose results they could, at most, interpret. Those with an advanced knowledge of the
stochastic equivalence between ﬁnancial products – in other words, those who can demonstrate or
modify the Black–Scholes formula – make up only 24% of the trading room. A regression helps us
show which properties favour this kind of skill in the room (Figure 1).
According to this regression, position in the division of labour (objectiﬁed by the dummy variable:
being or not being a ﬁnancial engineer or R&D engineer) and degree (objectiﬁed by the variable pos-
session or non-possession of a degree higher than the baccalaureate + ﬁve years) offer the best prob-
ability of having such capabilities. This result is explained by the degree of the division of labour and
by the academic nature of the knowledge used. With such a small sample (94 people), it is not poss-
ible to establish very precise results. The principal effect is ‘absorbed’ by the position held or the
Figure 1. Knowing Black & Scholes. A regression model. Regression modelling the probability of having or not having advanced 
mathematical knowledge.
Note: **P < 5%; *P <10 %.
degree obtained, both of which are also the result of social discrimination. While under the threshold
of signiﬁcance used by econometrics (5% or 10%), the parameters nevertheless indicate the sense of a
correlation and require further commentary and possibly conﬁrmation with a larger study. The
seniority parameter is positive but not very signiﬁcant, which undoubtedly reﬂects the demographic
structure of the jobs more than a tendency to improve mathematical capabilities with seniority
(rather, the opposite is true). Women, poorly represented in both the trading rooms and in scientiﬁc
disciplines, are consequently also under-represented among those with a strong grasp of Black–
Scholes. Finally, the social origin of the parents plays a rather signiﬁcant role. It is measured by
two variables: having or not having a father in an ‘economic’ occupation (farmers, craftsmen, trades-
men, heads of company, liberal professionals, and administration executives in the private sector);
having or not having a father with a bachelor’s degree (French licence). The respondents whose
fathers work in an economic profession have, all things being equal, a lower probability of knowing
how to demonstrate or modify complex stochastic relations. Thus, even in a world of equivalences
between all kinds of prices and products, the conversion of one form of capital into another, of initial
economic capital into cultural capital, comes at a high price. One may note also the negative impact
and relevance of a father’s high-level degree on the probability of mastering the Black–Scholes for-
mula. This ﬁnding shows that the holders of this cultural capital are more ‘parvenus’ than ‘heirs’ of
the school system. Indeed, the fathers of members of the room with a high-level degree (liberal pro-
fessionals, managers in the private sector) often acquired this degree more for its economic value that
for its cultural value. On the other hand, parents of the mathematical virtuosos, who often work in
public service, may give relatively greater value to its cultural component than to its economic com-
ponent, even if they often have a lower level degree.
Those whose fathers belong to the dominant classes, in particular the economic sectors, are, rela-
tively speaking, more numerous among salespeople and the heads of the room. These people,
although often more highly educated, do not need to know – or no longer need to know – complex
mathematical relations. On the other hand, the parents of engineers are slightly more likely (even if,
due to the sample size, the difference is minor) to be from the ‘cultural’ sectors of the dominant
classes (such as engineers and especially public ofﬁce managers and professors) or from the middle
or working classes. R&D engineers also have slightly lower level and less prestigious degrees (ENSI-
MAG, Télécom, ENSAE) than the most dominant members of the room, who have often studied at
the Ecole Polytechnique or Ecole Centrale. Far from preventing the less highly educated engineers
from entering the ﬁeld of mathematics, this initial difference in mathematical ability seems, on
the contrary, to favour it. Power and money are primarily of interest to the dominant individuals
in the room: of the students from the Ecole Polytechnique and the Ecole Centrale, those who go
into trading are those who have the greatest economic dispositions and are most willing to give
up their educational values. Once in the room, they thus readily delegate mathematical modelling
to lower level engineers. The intellectual interest of these lower level engineers in complex math-
ematical relations does not only lie in the occupational structure. In a somewhat more working-
class background, it is also to be found in the cultural goodwill that guarantees the educational
investment enabling this type of acquisition. This educational investment is not limited to its econ-
omic aspect, but rather affects the whole moral being and entails an adhesion to the educational
order and its values, all the more so as it is the university that allowed the employees to become
what they are. Thus, at UC, the orientation towards ﬁnancial mathematics has, in many respects,
the same constants as the university ﬁeld (Bourdieu 1988).
While for the lower level engineers (promoted from minor engineering schools), the assertion of
mathematical expertise and adhesion to the commercial order of the room seem somewhat compa-
tible, the same cannot be said for those who possess greater cultural capital in its academic form.
Marc, a former researcher in theoretical physics at the Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), is the ‘quant’, that is,
the mathematics expert in the room. After a few years spent at the CNRS, faced with a lack of opportunities to
progress within his ﬁeld of research and ﬁnding himself under ﬁnancial pressure, he chose to move into ﬁnance.
Given that his academic disposition goes against the commercial spirit of the room, he has an unhappy
relationship with ﬁnance. Indeed, he does not particularly like the atmosphere in the room or his ‘mono-con-
ﬁgured’ colleagues who have ‘cut all the cables plugged into any outputs’ other than money. ‘Modelling arbit-
rage relations’, he explains, ‘is like throwing a chair out the window and trying to model the distribution of the
pieces! It can be done, it can become very complicated, but it is quite limited’.
What’s more, Marc is only given trivial problems to solve, such as minor improvements and arrangements of
existing models in order to price new products. In 1998, UC’s head of room was not interested in developing a
real team of mathematics researchers (similar to those employed in Anglo-Saxon banks). So Marc is not given
time to implement alternative models to the Black–Scholes paradigm, still in use for modelling prices. He would
like to develop alternative models where the volatility presumed constant by the Black–Scholes model would
itself follow a stochastic process. But the traders are not interested, because this type of modelling prevents
them from calculating the ‘marked-to-market’ book value (according to the daily prices), and forces them to
work blind for a long period before being able to observe whether the arbitrage is winning or losing. He
even says that he would like to do ‘proprietary trading’, that is, to have his own securities portfolio in the
long run. The aim of such a trading position would not be to ﬁnd the right formula in order to earn money
but rather to earn money in order to show that the arbitrage formula is right.
R&D engineers are thus in a position where they wage a symbolic struggle with the ﬁnancial oper-
ators (traders and salespeople). Even if they are responsible for most of the room’s ﬁnancial proﬁt
through the quality of the equivalence relations they establish and the performance of the software
they develop, R&D engineers do not succeed, at UC at least, in obtaining a political and economic
position that matches their contribution. It is the ﬁnancial operators who harness the activity and
transactions and thus succeed in making others believe that they are responsible for the proﬁt.
In 1998, the power struggle did not favour R&D engineers. While data-processing modelling
might still progress and lead to the suppression of some trading jobs, further mathematical model-
ling does not appear to have been so advantageous. Thus, during a meeting in which the results of the
room were presented, an analyst working in modelling questioned the head of room on the advisa-
bility of hiring a second quant:
‘There’s only one quant?’
‘The value added of a new model is falling’, answered the head of the room. ‘There are some people who believe
in Graal and magic formulas!’
‘If the model’s bad, we lose money!’
‘If we have a better model, we don’t earn that much more money than the market!’
Contrary to the opinion of some American banks, which invested massively in developing teams of
research in ﬁnancial mathematics, UC, formerly at the forefront of arbitrage modelling, now con-
siders that the marginal output of more powerful mathematical models is decreasing. This strategic
orientation is undoubtedly linked with the increasingly commercial orientation of the room.
3.2. Consequences and limits of mathematisation
The traders who deal structured products, in particular the six traders working at the ﬁnancial engin-
eering desk, are familiar with the mathematical foundations of arbitrage relations. First, they are
highly qualiﬁed and have chosen to work for the ﬁnancial engineering desk because it has the highest
positions and products in the hierarchy of technicality. Second, they must arbitrate some very com-
plex products such as double-barrier options. For that, they have to make proper use of arbitrage
relations. For this kind of product, the ideal is not so much to deal but to make a few major trans-
actions with very high margins. Since they often deal in new products, they ask the R&D team to
improve the software used for pricing or sending orders. They have to explain their needs to this
team, sometimes taking part in modelling or supervising. Thus, the relationship between engineers
and traders is a mixture of rivalry and complicity.
While most of the traders on exotic options and structured products have in-depth knowledge of
complex mathematics, the same cannot be said for traders on more traditional options. Indeed, they
work on standardised products for which modelling has already been carried out. They do not really
need to ask anything of the engineers or speak the language of mathematical modelling.
When they have been trained in ﬁnance or at engineering school, these traders have a very rough
knowledge of the main stages of mathematical modelling, or they are at least able to provide the
ﬁnancial interpretation of the principal parameters that result from this modelling. However, it is
not necessary to know this in order to be good at options trading. Moreover some traders on war-
rants (that is, options issued directly by private banks), often foreigners, have not obtained a degree
and have a working-class background. The trader has a screen in front of him, with the parameters of
the formula: delta, gamma, vega, theta, the buying and selling advice. The job then becomes rather
‘push-button’. One of the risks of mathematical rationalisation is the elimination of certain parts of
arbitrage-based trading, now performed entirely by computers. This is already the case for Ivan,
whose job is to set the parameters of the computer, which then deals for him.
Competing against less well-educated people, beginners, and middle-management ofﬁce workers,
trading operators will, on the one hand, boast about their mathematical abilities in order to justify
their right to occupy such advantageous positions. On the other hand, however, faced with the grow-
ing importance of mathematical and computer modelling in trading, they try to maintain a certain
autonomy, for instance by giving more and more importance to speculative trading, in which proﬁt
is not guaranteed by a necessary mathematical relation between two products. To maintain their pos-
ition and autonomy, they take advantage of the present imperfections in mathematical modelling.
This type of modelling, for instance, does not take sufﬁcient account of developments in the volatility
of securities. To arbitrate an option against an underlying security can be regarded as speculation on
the development of the security’s volatility. Ordinary options traders thus maintain their autonomy
by taking advantage of ﬂaws in the model and can carry out a hybrid form of arbitrage that is closer
to ordinary speculation.
4. Rather economical economic analysis
4.1. Pragmatic use
Economic analysis is not only a type of academic knowledge, like mathematical arbitrage. It is also, 
in part, general knowledge, which does not need to be learned at university. In the trading rooms, 
many have never studied economics as part of their degrees but nevertheless use basic analysis on a 
daily basis. Thus, according to our questionnaire, 53% of the respondents use macroeconomic 
reasoning: 10% because it is scientiﬁc, 27% because it works, and 16% because everyone else does.
Of operators – a category that has to develop winning strategies on the market – salespeople (89%
of them) use economic reasoning more than traders do (67%). Salespeople must canvass customers 
(fund managers, company treasurers) and offer them derivatives managed by the traders. Therefore, 
they have to make a sales pitch in which economic reasoning features prominently in order to con-
vince the customer either to try a bold speculation or protect himself from the risks incurred: ‘With 
the crisis in Asia, your portfolio is vulnerable. You need to be covered, we can guarantee your port-
folio’. On the other hand, the traders in a room devoted to arbitrage do not often have to predict 
variations in prices based on economic aggregates. Nor do they need to explain their choice with 
clear reasoning. Other categories of personnel who intervene very little in the market (especially 
the engineers, who are often wary of macroeconomics) do not have the chance to use economic 
reasoning and are not interested in this type of analysis.
4.2. Agents and distribution tools
As for stochastic calculation, some agents in the room occupy a structural and functional position in 
the spread of ‘economic rationality’. Economic reasoning was deemed signiﬁcant enough during the 
1980s and 1990s for all the trading rooms to adopt a method of organisation with an economic 
analysis expert (the market economist) and a time frame for the presentation of its forecasts (the 
morning meeting). Ian, the market economist of the room, therefore explains the economic news
during the morning meeting and distributes a written summary. He comments on changes in the
markets on the previous day and draws his listeners’ attention to the ﬁgures that are to be announced
during the day (inﬂation, growth, etc.). For those ﬁgures, Ian reminds everyone of the ‘market con-
sensus’, that is, the average prediction made by the main forecasters, and the expected evolution of
the markets depending on whether the ﬁgure announced is below or above the forecast.
The work of economists does not require a very high level of expertise. In this case, the economist
uses neither macroeconomic models nor econometric forecasts. His work consists more in
popularising economic articles produced by the economic services of banks among operators.
‘The room is only interested in consensus’, he says, as an excuse for not taking a greater interest
in more theoretical economics. As the trading room of UC is dedicated to equity derivatives and
favours arbitrage over speculation, economic reasoning is perhaps given less importance than in
other trading rooms, in particular those which favour speculation over arbitrage and brokerage or
those which trade ﬁxed-income securities, on which major macroeconomic variables and the econ-
omic policy of states have a much greater impact.
The market economist, whose audience is limited, is merely one mediator of economic reasoning
among others in the trading room. Whether or not they listen to the economist, the members of the
room will keep an eye on news about companies’ progress. By reading ﬁnancial newspapers on a
daily basis and referring continually to Reuters and Bloomberg, they ﬁll their mind with information,
advertisements, rumours, and even ready-to-use economic reasoning. Although less visible, their
working tools also contain condensed economic reasoning, whether assumptions for pricing algor-
ithms or economic forecasts integrated into their databases.
Hence, through many different sources (economists, media, rumours, conversations, searches),
market operators ﬁnd themselves immersed in a universe where economic reasoning, more or
less elaborate and orthodox, is available – in simple narrative forms that do not require prior theor-
etical knowledge – for adoption, handling, composition, and appropriation.
4.3. The mistrustful and the virtuosos
Unequally informed, the members of the trading room are differentiated by their capacity to
implement economic reasoning. Some use it as an extra that may be of use, for example, in convin-
cing the customer, but which requires a cautious approach because of its high degree of inaccuracy.
Others are true virtuosos of economic reasoning and connect consecutions of macroeconomic vari-
ables to prices with surprising speed.
Patrick, a salesman at Loan R., has very little faith in economic reasoning, which he considers uncertain: ‘Econ-
omists often make more mistakes than chartists. We went to see the economist with a customer who was very
exposed to the strong sterling. And so he said to us, ‘Well, the sterling will come down in the next six months,
because interest rates are too high. Therefore the government will lower the rates and the sterling will be at
around 9.30’. Now, the sterling costs 10 francs. You see, it is an enormous difference. And so, you see, he
was totally wrong. You never know with economists: they always have the right explanations at the right
time, but for the future… it is not so easy, and that’s only to be expected’.
On the other hand, a portfolio manager questioned by Claudine Carluer (1994, p. 351) links fast causal
sequences in order to explain why, in period of economic growth, he is more aware of interest rates than com-
panies’ results: ‘It’s obvious. It’s what is happening now in the United States. Fast growth, overheating, a rise in
interest rates because of inﬂationary anticipations: that it is the current path’.
It is not easy to identify social causes of the use of economic reasoning. It seems to depend on the
overall orientation of the trading room and the local position of economic reasoning within the sym-
bolic hierarchy. At UC, the people in the room whose father had an ‘economic’ profession, such as
businessman or liberal professional, use economic reasoning more than others (57% as opposed to
44%). However, these people, over-represented among salespeople, perhaps use it more because of
their function than on account of their social origins. In the local context of UC’s trading room,
where economic reasoning occupies a lower position in the symbolic hierarchy than mathematical
arbitrage, those with the greatest cultural capital generally prefer to excel in mathematical arbitrage.
In the Banque Parisienne de Placement (BPP) trading room, on the other hand, which focuses on
currency and ﬁxed-income securities speculation, economic reasoning occupies a more signiﬁcant
position and a higher level in the hierarchy of values. At the time of its morning meeting, traders
from this room, who are often very highly educated (Ecole Polytechnique, ENSAE, and a former
philosophy professor), compete to perform the best economic reasoning – in this case, that which
is more complex and closer to academic discourse.
4.4. Neo-classical reasoning
In general, when an economic event occurs, it is possible to deduce a number of economic conse-
quences from it, which may be contradictory (Lordon 1997). Some economists have often pointed 
out that, when such alternatives occur, the economic reasoning used in the market is generally neo-
classical. Some economists have even studied the self-fulﬁlling nature of neo-classical predic-tions, 
thanks to the ﬁnancial markets and their belief in neo-classical economics. In her studies of the form 
of reasoning used by portfolio managers, Carluer (1994) observes that the reference model they use 
is neo-classical economic reasoning.
A large number of factors contribute to this uniformity of economic reasoning: the newspapers 
and the media; ofﬁcial publications which, one way or another, tend to reﬂect the ‘Washington Con-
sensus’ (Dezalay & Garth 1998); the fact that neo-classical reasoning is fairly simple and systematic; 
and the need to predict the actions of the central banks (which tend to be extremely neo-classical).
These are the words of Thierry, an older left-wing trader and witness to the spontaneous spread of neo-classical 
reasoning:
And then in ‘80, when the left came to power, there was a high level of debt, that is, a whole lot of public pro-
grammes were planned, which had to be ﬁnanced. And the state then took the place of everything – normally in 
economics, only the company should borrow on the capital market and not the State. (Thierry)
To test this tendency to adopt neo-classical reasoning, we proposed two alternative forms of econ-
omic reasoning in the questionnaire, which were equally plausible (ﬁgure 2). One is somewhat 
ortho-dox and the other somewhat heterodox (or at least Keynesian). From 1994 to 1997, the 
American rate of unemployment was the variable on which the stock exchange market was 
polarised. The dominant reasoning was inspired by the Phillips curve, which is a ‘classical’ version of 
some Keyne-sian forms of reasoning. According to this approach, there is a decreasing relation 
between the rate of unemployment and inﬂation. Any fall in unemployment was interpreted during 
these years as a sign of a return to inﬂation and an imminent rise in interest rates, which would entail 
a fall in prices. After 1997, as this relation had no empirical veriﬁcation, the interpretation lost 
ground. Some even started talking of a ‘New Era’ in the USA – a new economic era of low 
unemployment, strong economic growth, and low inﬂation.
While the neo-classical answer was the most popular (45%), the alternative answer was frequently 
selected (29%), maybe because unemployment failed to have an impact on American inﬂation. Some 
(5%), perhaps with a better understanding of economics, ticked both answers and sometimes gave
Figure 2. Economic opinion of members of the room.
explanations in the margins. The question on the rise in public debt was less striking to members of 
the room. Apart from Japan, where a public revival of the economy was attempted a number of 
times, and some of the revival plans could have brought about a rise in the markets, the budgetary 
revival had not been on the agenda in the OECD countries since the beginning of the 1980s. On the 
other hand, the disengagement of the state became the standard for good economic policy. The 
members of the room had assimilated this standard; in their answers, they generally chose the ortho-
dox vision over the Keynesian one (Figure 2).
To gain a better understanding of what motivates orthodox opinions, we drew up the following 
table (Figure 3) containing the proportion of people who expressed an orthodox or subtle opinion 
according to annual salary levels (Figure 3). This proportion clearly increases in line with salaries. 
Seniority in ﬁnance, income, and hierarchical positions are somewhat narrowly correlated. Every-
thing occurs as if the propensity to be ‘orthodox’ increases along with integration within the ﬁnancial 
world. Junior workers’ answers depend more on their preliminary knowledge of economics (the 
economics taught in school is more Keynesian than that used in the trading rooms), or even on their 
political or ethical convictions. In the ordinary world, any fall in unemployment is thus considered 
‘good’ and any rise is ‘bad’. Junior employees may think that what is ‘good’ in the world of politics 
and economics must be also ‘good’ for the market. With a little experience, they learn that the 
opposite is true (during the 1990s at least). Initially shocked, they eventually get used to such a 
sequence of economic consecution.
Even if the tendency to use orthodox reasoning is very strong and is reinforced through inte-
gration into the ﬁnancial world, one should not think that all economic opinions are uniform or neo-
classical. It is important to remember that the consensus is all the more difﬁcult to establish because 
the group is so large. As Baker showed, the larger the group of traders in a pit of options quotation, 
the more cliques are formed, the greater the dissensus between the cliques, and the more volatile the 
price of the option (Baker 1984). Moreover, some economists observed that on many markets, if 
economic reasoning and future forecasts were identical, transactions would not be possible. 
Sometimes, when some anticipated ﬁgures are announced, the market has a short period of 
hesitation. It often happens that it goes in one direction and then makes a sudden turnaround. This 
phenomenon is due to the unequal ﬁnancial power of people who interpret the ﬁgure’s impact on the 
price differently.
4.5. Economic reasoning as an unconscious exercise of semiology
As Carluer explains (1994), even if the types of reasoning are integrated into a stable and homo-
geneous neo-classical reference model, the particular reasoning of portfolio managers is unstable
and multiple. The great variability of the types of reasoning within the dominant referent is partly
due to the cycle of ﬁgures selected by the market. This cycle of signiﬁcant ﬁgures also corresponds
Figure 3. Proportion of people who expressed an orthodox or subtle (i.e. they chose both options) opinion regarding the two 
questions of economic forecasts, according to their annual salary.
to a cycle of economic causal reasoning, which at any given time will appear signiﬁcant, more sig-
niﬁcant than those underpinned by other ﬁgures which no longer move the market.
However, instability in reasoning is not due solely to the instability of the market itself, but to the
type of reasoning. As Claudine Carluer observes, economic reasoning is relatively simple and unilat-
eral: ‘They are pronounced in a manner that leaves room for neither doubt nor contradiction, and
they are relatively short and simple’ (Carluer 1994, p. 235). The reasoning generally consists either in
‘considering the direct inﬂuence of the economic indicator’ on the price or in ‘considering its inﬂu-
ence through the inﬂuence it exerts on an intermediate element’ (Carluer 1994, p. 236) – generally
interest rates. This type of highly economic reasoning enables very swift intervention in the markets
and allows people to seize proﬁts before they disappear. However, it also favours the formulation of
causal chains that can become contradictory.
In the following example, the portfolio manager almost contradicts himself when he answers two questions in
succession on the inﬂuence of growth on the stock exchange market. In the ﬁrst case, the fall in the unemploy-
ment rate means economic growth, a rise in interest rates, and thus a fall in the markets, and in the second case,
a rise in production implies economic growth, proﬁt, and a rise in the market.
For stock exchange markets, does a strong increase in job creation cause an economic rise or fall? Why?
I would say job creation is synonymous with growth. Synonymous with growth means synonymous with
inﬂation, and where there is inﬂation there is risk… a bit like what occurred in the United States recently, a
risk of inﬂation and so a rise in rates and thus fall in the markets [… ]
For the stock exchanges, does a rise in industrial production cause a rise or a fall? Why?
A rise in industrial production means growth; where there is growth there is an improvement in ﬁnancial
results, and the markets are quite keen on that. (Carluer 1994, p. 352)
In this example, the portfolio manager uses the term ‘synonymous’ to characterise the stages of his
reasoning. Undoubtedly this is just a manner of speaking, and he could easily have used a more
scientiﬁc term such as ‘implies’. Beyond the contingency of the terms employed, however, we
might say that by using the word ‘synonymous’, this person is unconsciously telling us the truth
about the exercise of economic reasoning in the trading rooms, where the economic analysis of
ordinary operators may be compared to an unconscious exercise of semiology: it is more an inves-
tigation into the connotation of the terms of economics or economic policy than a rigorous exercise
in establishing macroeconomic sequences.
The spontaneous schemas of interpretation of economic information are added to a vague knowl-
edge of economics. They allow an automatic intervention, without reﬂection, when economic ﬁgures
are announced.
Ivan had a small ‘spiel’ portfolio (an authorisation to speculate with the funds of the bank without being cov-
ered). But he had to remove this ‘position’ because he faced some losses on CAC 40 futures. He tried to specu-
late on one of Jospin’s important political speeches. Nine times out of ten he won, but at the tenth try he lost
everything. He believed that what Jospin had said was bad for the market (thus he sold), whereas it was bullish.
These schemas are organised. Anything that could be interpreted as a threat to monetary stability in
the economic policy ﬁgures or speeches will be interpreted as a factor causing a rise in interest rates
and a drop in prices. On the other hand, anything that resembles calming allows a fall in interest rates
and a rise in prices. Thus, the ‘fall in prices/rise in prices’ pair is partly determined by the paradoxical
schemas of tension and relaxation, threat and calming.
5. Pagan knowledge: charts
While mathematised arbitrage and economic reasoning are, to some extent, linked to academic 
knowledge, chartist analysis, on the other hand, also known as ‘technical analysis’, is an indigenous 
knowledge with no academic extension. It is a rather old technique. Charles Henry Dow (founder of 
the Wall Street Newspaper and the father of the Dow Jones index) invented it in the late 1880s. In 
France, it was not properly adopted until the major transformation of the ﬁnancial markets in the
middle of the 1980s. Trading rooms organised according to the American model, with their oper-
ators often coming from Anglo-Saxon countries, were a more favourable place for the importation
and spread of such techniques than the traditional stockbroking agency.
The general principle of technical analysis is to try to predict future prices from past prices. Chartists
therefore try to detect trends and typical conﬁgurations. This type of forecast, although used in many
ﬁelds, such as economic forecasting – with its time series and econometrics – is regarded by dominant
neo-classical economics as irrelevant in the ﬁnancial ﬁeld. According to neo-classical economists, since
prices will immediately reﬂect all forecasts by all ﬁnancial agents made on the basis of all available
information, only new information, not past information (like the shape of prices), can lead to a
move in prices. The result of this reasoning is that it should be impossible from a theoretical point
of view to predict prices on the basis of past prices.
3.1. Basic chartist ﬁgures There are several chartist techniques: techniques for graphic represen-
tation, such as bar and line graphs (the most commonly used), ‘Japanese candlesticks’, or points and
ﬁgures; various important ﬁgures such as ‘support’ or ‘resistance’ lines, ‘head-and-shoulders’, ‘V for-
mation’, ‘W formation’, triangles, inverted triangles, ‘ﬂag and pennants’, ascending channels, gaps;
forecasting techniques using the Elliott wave principle or the Fibonacci numerical series; trend indi-
cators, such as moving averages; and so on.
5.1. Some basic chartist ﬁgures
The chartist technique of ‘resistance’ lines is at the origin of many chartist ﬁgures. This technique 
consists in isolating some maxima (or minima) and plotting straight lines between them (Figure 4). 
These lines are called ‘resistance’ lines (or ‘support’ lines), and the price is supposed to bounce 
against them. For example, in the case of an ascending triangle or ascending channel, the price 
remains conﬁned for a time between the two lines of resistance. In this case, it is said that the price 
‘tests the line’. However, it can just as easily ‘break the line’ (for example at the end of the ascending 
channel). Technical analysis is used to locate signiﬁcant points. The reasoning is of an either/or type. 
Either the price tests the resistance line and returns to its previous level, or the price breaks the line 
and will strongly rise (or fall).
Elliott waves are a collection of ‘rules’ that are supposed to predict the succession of ‘waves’ (a 
wave is a price movement consisting, at least, of a rise and a fall, but maybe more). It is supposed to 
be a ‘philosophical’ method. Here are some examples of these very strange rules: ‘the third wave is 
never shortest’, ‘the second wave never traces more than 100% of the ﬁrst’, and so on.
Moving averages are a well-known method of studying time series (in history and statistics), 
because they have the advantage of smoothing discrepancies and determining trends. However, 
chartists’ use of moving averages is rather odd. For example, chartists use two moving averages (a 
10-day small one and a 30-day large one) and use sayings like ‘when the short-term moving average 
breaks above the long-term one, it is a sign of a rise’ (also called ‘golden cross’) o r ‘when the 
short-term moving average breaks below the long-term one, it is a sign of a fall’ (‘death cross’).
Figure 4. Prices with some basic chartist ﬁgures.
To understand its success, one should not, like the neo-classical theorists, reduce chartist analysis
to a simple linear interpolation of past prices. Rather, it is a subtle art of interpreting prices based on
the recognition of forms and the search for the appropriate saying. The difﬁculty with technical
analysis based on resistance lines stems entirely from the fact that it is possible to plot a large number
of lines, which will eventually become irrelevant. Often, chartists state that they need to have an idea
of the market’s evolution before checking whether this idea is conﬁrmed graphically by a series of
lines.
Ronan, after ﬁnishing business school and obtaining a Diploma of Advanced Studies (DEA) in stochastic math-
ematics, was hired at UC where his predecessor in the room taught him technical analysis. His principal work
consists in envisioning future trends in the markets with the use of chartist techniques, and explaining his fore-
casts every morning (in English) at the morning meeting.
On 20th December 1997, he made the following forecast for the CAC 40, which had closed at 2822 points the
previous day. He envisioned a fall that should either stop at 2812, or at 2784, or in the worst case at 2650, unless
prices should rise, in which case it would reach 2857 or 2885:
In the longer term, an interpretation of the rise from a low of 2475 still favours the X-wave (min: 2880 already
met, norm: 3000, max: 3100). The major downward movement seems to conﬁrm: caution. The risk is a retest of
the 2650 area.
In the short term, a downward movement seems to conﬁrm: a break below 2812±4 will target 2784±2 then the
2650 area.
If an impulsive downward movement is on the horizon, 2857±7 must remain unchallenged. Be aware that a
break above this level will target the 2885±3, which, if broken, would invalidate the immediate downward
structure.
Even if it employs several contradictory strategies, technical analysis can produce ﬁnancial proﬁts,
because it enables operators to prepare ﬁnancial orders at key points, which are often important
for the market.
5.2. A popular technique
In the trading room of UC, 41% of the population use technical analysis, 16% because everyone else 
does so, 21% because it works, and 3% because it is scientiﬁc. The majority use resistance lines (26%) 
and Elliott waves (24%), followed by moving averages (14%). The members of the room generally 
learned these techniques alone (7%) or thanks to the presentations given by the company analyst 
(17%). Only 4% of them learned these techniques at university.
The probability of using technical analysis depends on the position held within the trading room.
The traders use chartist techniques the most (63% of them), almost as much as economic analysis.
Sales people (58%) also use chartist techniques to develop their sales pitch and convince the custo-
mer. Other people who carry out fewer market operations use it very little. The position held does
not entirely explain the use or non-use of ‘charts’.
According to their social and academic origins, the members of the room acquire dispositions that
encourage or discourage the use of these unscientiﬁc, quasi-proverbial formulas, all the more so
given that these techniques compete with and sometimes contradict nobler, more legitimate tech-
niques in the academic hierarchy. 50% of the children of liberal professionals and 46% of the children
of businessmen thus use charts, as opposed to 36% of the children of engineers. The most highly
educated people and those from educated families feel reluctant to use such a rudimentary technique
in comparison with mathematical arbitrage or economic analysis. On the other hand, people from
more working-class backgrounds can make (excellent) use of technical analysis as a way to compen-
sate for their lower ability to carry out more academic reasoning.
A regression model for the use of Elliott waves enables us to see the determinants of the use of
charts (Figure 5). The person’s function – salesperson or trader – is one of the most signiﬁcant fac-
tors. Being integrated within the ﬁnancial world, measured by the dichotomous variable ‘having or
not having four years of seniority in ﬁnance’, strongly increases the ‘all things being equal’
probability of using Elliott waves. As these techniques are only learned in trading rooms, it is fairly 
normal that seniority favours their use. One can also see that the higher one’s cultural capital, the 
lower one’s probability of using ‘charts’. Those individuals from working-class families, or from 
backgrounds in which economic capital is relatively more important than cultural capital, are 
capable of showing economic goodwill and therefore adopt the techniques that work easily, even 
though those techniques are unworthy of people who are capable of cultural goodwill and who 
are more attached to academic knowledge.
5.3. Controversies over the capacity of the charts
One of the characteristics of chartist analysis, unlike other methods, is that people always have a 
strong opinion on it. It has both its detractors and its advocates.
Some, like Patrick, who can be characterised by his economic goodwill, are fascinated by the forecasting
capacity of charts. They are ready to spend large sums in order to acquire an economic technique that
makes it possible to make so much money, despite of its dubious bases.
‘It is true that when you look at charts, you think that they might even be too powerful. You could almost forget
about economic analysis and only trust chartists’ analyses, because they are so powerful’, Patrick says.
Some, on the other hand, despise charts and consider these techniques ridiculous.
‘The tradition [at the BPP] is rather to make fun of it, but to look at it anyway because you have to. In principle
everyone ﬁnds this absurd! But at the same time, you can’t deny the self-fulﬁlling nature of the charts, and so we
look at them’, says Quentin, a former philosophy professor.
For operators who do not like this technique and for economists who study ﬁnance, the fact that
charts work is rather mysterious. It is not enough to simply denounce the stupidity of the technique.
It is also necessary to be able to provide real reasons as to why technical analysis works on the basis of
bad assumptions. Some will explain charts by their self-fulﬁlling nature. Others will explain why
there are trends. Others will say that some chart ﬁgures (for instance, movements like an ascending
channel) work because of insider trading And so on.
It could be said that economists have not completely solved the reasons behind the power of tech-
nical analysis. The economists who developed the assumption of efﬁcient markets denied it had any
validity and argued that money made from technical analysis was simply due to the random
Figure 5. The use of chartist methods. Probability of using Elliott waves: Rough ratios and ‘all things being equal’ effects. 
Note: **P < 5%; *P < 10%; (*)P < 20%. Active variables are in normal text; supplementary variables are in italics.
distribution of proﬁts. Many economists are not so unequivocal today, and heterodox economists,
thanks to the ﬁnancial successes produced by technical analysis, denounce the empirical fragility
of neo-classical theories. In general, heterodox economists consider technical analysis a self-fulﬁlling
phenomenon, the simplest model of which is the ‘rational bubble’. We cannot doubt that most of the
success of technical analysis comes from this kind of mechanism. And if astrology, recently intro-
duced to the ﬁnancial markets, ever manages to be similarly successful, we will see a conﬁrmation
of the possibility of self-fulﬁlling phenomena. The problem, however, is that ‘conventionalist’ theory
cannot explain how people adopt this technique and why some individuals on the market will use
some techniques that are very rare. As shown here, there are social reasons that promote the adop-
tion of such techniques. A dialogue between economists and sociologists would help to reveal more
about the reason for this adoption.
6. Overall picture
A description of the various forms of reasoning and winning strategies shows that they are relatively
differentiated. It is therefore possible to describe the trading room as a competitive space for the
appropriation of economic and symbolic proﬁts. The following multiple correspondence analysis
gives an overall picture of the orientation of operators in this true bazaar of rationality (Figure 6).
In this multiple correspondence analysis, the answers to the following questions were used as
active variables: attending the morning meeting (always, sometimes, or never); the usefulness of pre-
sentations given by economists, chartists, and colleagues; the use of charts; the chartist techniques
used; the reasons for their use (speculating, predicting the evolution of prices, ﬁnding the right
moment, seeking reassurance); the means by which these were learnt (presentations, university,
or self-study); the use of economics; the orthodoxy and heterodoxy of opinion on the effect of
debt and unemployment on prices; the type of economic information used; the use of complex math-
ematics; favourite type of prices.
In this multiple correspondence analysis, axis 1 contrasts the most integrated on the right with
those who are least integrated on the left. Axis 2 contrasts various forms of strategies, technical analy-
sis, and mathematics at the top, with economic analysis or the absence of any method at the bottom.
In fact, this multiple correspondence analysis allows four areas to be quite clearly distinguished. In
the upper left quadrant are the mathematics virtuosos who can demonstrate or modify Black and
Scholes relations. These technicians of volatility can use ﬁne arbitrage so well that they are able to
confront the low volatility that produces smaller proﬁts. Like those in the lower left quadrant
(who do not use mathematics at all), people in the upper left use neither charts nor basic economics.
They do not go to the morning meeting, and they ﬁnd the presentations made in the morning meet-
ing to be of no use. They tend to have a heterodox opinion on the impact of public debt and unem-
ployment on prices.
In the upper right quadrant are all the experts of chartist techniques. Those who use the rarest
techniques such as Japanese candlesticks, points and ﬁgures, and moving averages are generally
self-taught and use them to speculate. These chartists can make money under difﬁcult conditions
such as stagnation or during a fall. Even if they do not seem to know much about economics,
they also use economic analysis because it works. They use mathematical relations as well, but
they can only interpret those relations or use them in a push-button way. In the lower right quadrant
are those who use economic reasoning. Some would say they use economic reasoning because it is
scientiﬁc. They can give orthodox answers to macroeconomics questions and are interested in all
kinds of economic information, such as take-over bids, downsizing, etc. They are informed about
all the possible techniques through Bloomberg, Reuters, newspapers, and so on. If they use charts,
it is rather because they say that everybody else does so. They are structurally rather bullish.
The study of supplementary variables allows us to see a clear juxtaposition of working positions
and desks with different winning strategies. To the far left of the ﬁrst axis are employees in less domi-
nant positions, such as back-ofﬁce staff with no real access to the market. In the upper left, we see
engineers, often from minor engineering schools, who work on the engineering desk. In the lower left 
are those who use almost no methods, such as heads of desk, female employees, or the securities 
lending desk (which remains closer to economic analysis). Most of the traders and trading desks 
are in the upper right, whereas most of the selling desks and sales people are in the lower right. 
The hierarchies according to seniority and salary are projected along axis 1.
A principle of orientation in this bazaar of rationality might be the search – conscious or uncon-
scious – for lower costs, since operators tend to use the techniques for which they have the greatest 
afﬁnity, capital, and disposition. More than the initial amount of capital, it is the total investment 
amount that seems to govern orientation in the trading room – investments that can conﬁrm the 
initial capital or convert it into another type of capital. Thus, those who employ mathematics and 
charts commonly differ from supporters of economic analysis by their lower amount of capital. 
However, they could also be differentiated according to the nature of their investments. Some, often 
those from a slightly more ‘cultural’ background and more likely to make cultural and aca-demic 
investments, express cultural goodwill (here scientiﬁc), and seek to extend their academic experience 
by holding positions in which mathematics is required (structured products traders, ﬁnancial 
engineers, or R&D engineers). Others, who tend to come from working-class or lower-middle-class 
backgrounds, in other words from a more modest background, express economic
Figure 6. Multiple correspondence analysis of the winning strategies.
goodwill, invest themselves academically only if their studies lead to a proﬁtable position, and seek
the most proﬁtable positions and techniques at work. Those from the wealthiest social backgrounds
(in this case the sales people, although this is not necessarily the case in all banks) are the most pre-
disposed to using economic analysis. The opposition between traders and engineers, on the one
hand, and sales (or users of economic analysis), on the other, does not lie solely in the degree to
which they make use of economic analysis. Traders, engineers, chartists, and arbitrageurs, to
some extent, all remain attached to the technique that enables them to be what they are, whether
the cultural and legitimate value of mathematics for some or the ‘counter-cultural’ value of charts
for others. (Financial operators from the lowest social background, who therefore have less knowl-
edge of the legitimate hierarchies, often take the most pride in their illegitimate techniques.) Sales
people and ‘historical’ traders who today work as heads of the room, who come from higher social
backgrounds and have relatively lower capital, have more successfully internalised the requirements
of economic domination. They see techniques as economic techniques alone, which they measure
only according to their proﬁtability. They use one technique or another indifferently, provided
that it works, but are able to maintain a kind of ‘axiologic neutrality’. For this reason, they ﬁnd it
much easier than most to ‘leave the market’, contradict the fundamental values of the market
(deals, volatility), and hang back in ‘juicier’, more political positions such as head of the desk or
head of the room.
Notes
1. A preliminary version was a chapter of my master thesis (Godechot 1998). It also constitutes a chapter of my book 
Les Traders (Godechot 2001). A shortened version was hastily translated into English for the The culture of ﬁnan-
cial markets conference in Bielefeld in 2000. This last version was edited and slightly revised thanks to Susannah 
Dale’s and Taylor Nelms’s help. The longer version includes more contextualisation in long footnotes, additional 
extracts from interviews and a small section devoted to the often-proposed ﬁnancial strategy of ‘feeling’, which I 
analyzed as a way of informally (and often unconsciously) hybridizing more explicit strategies such as those 
described in the paper.
2. This label was coined in 1999 by a group of young Ph.D. researchers in Social Sciences in Paris studying ﬁnance
differently, guided by the model of the social studies of science. Cf. http://ssfa.free.fr
3. Hence Bourdieu shows that house-buyers begin calculating their budget very gradually (Bourdieu 2005).
4. The observation was done between December 1997 and April 1998 within the trading room of a large bank we shall
refer to as Universal Company (UC). Some interviews were also conducted. A questionnaire was given to members 
of the room, half of whom responded (94 total responses).
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